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Post-scriptum 
‘But that is not enough’ 
 
Teresa Stoppani 
 
 
 
Claim 
 
The question behind “this thing called theory”, asked in architecture but without 
mentioning architecture, has a purposeful if not arrogant implication: that architecture 
has a theory of its own, or rather, that architectural theory is intrinsic to architecture, 
and an indispensible part of it – “architecture” theory then, rather than “architectural” 
theory. The question is the same as affirming that theory does exist (exists, existed, 
will exist) in architecture as something different than other forms and areas of theory, 
although it remains deeply interconnected with them, and is all too often reliant on 
them. “This thing” then calls for specificity, and for a return to the discipline of 
architecture, as well as to the thinking that occurs within it. 
 
The arrogance of architecture theory, its calling for its own (ad-rogare), that forceful 
claim that appropriates, is an assertion of and for the right to be. It requires, as in the 
Latin adrogatio,1 a statement of commitment made in front of the public (the Roman 
populus, and later its representatives) that legitimizes a consensual and mutual 
appropriation (and affiliation): in this case, in relation to architecture, it is the claim to 
an area of discourse, as well as the claim to a role within architecture itself. 
The “arrogance” of this thing called theory is ultimately a claim of responsibility, a 
serious act of incorporation, as well as a commitment to a form of care. It is also a 
commitment to a relation to an-other.  
 
 In arrogating architecture (to itself), architecture theory claims a stake on it, cares 
about architecture and helps define it. Architecture theory attributes to itself the right 
to exist within architecture; it also claims a necessary role with(in) it. As in the 
Roman adrogatio, the relation of convenience and limitation is mutual, as architecture 
claims theory to itself. Architecture thinks. The two – architecture theory and 
architecture – do not coincide, but each cannot exist without the other. They co-
(l)laborate, that is, they are at work together. Architecture without its theory is not 
architecture. 
 
The mutual and public claim of care is important, as it is not a claim of autonomy. Far 
from it: architecture can only exist in relation to what it is not, to what makes it 
possible, to what inhabits it, and architecture theory plays an important role in 
articulating such relations. Relations change (are changing), and with them the 
adaptable, fleeting, sometimes volatile voice of theory, while architecture itself 
remains relatively slow, caught by its very nature between the space of 
experimentation and that of realization (although these too are amazingly brought to 
converge today). 
 
A practice that changes constantly, that has no axioms or definitions, that is not 
prescriptive but relational both within architecture and with building, a malleable 
practice that that thinks with society and both reflects it and transforms it, cannot be a 
discipline. “This thing called architecture theory” does not exist, the historian tells 
me; and he is right: as a discipline, this “thing” does not exist. It ceased to exist as a 
discipline (and ancillary one) when it stopped being descriptive and prescriptive, that 
is, when it stopped being a tool for, rather than a voice with. Yet, even that form of 
architecture theory – a “discipline disciplining” theory – was indeed struggling to 
keep at bay contrasting voices, unorthodox practices, material evidence, endeavouring 
as it did, throughout its history (yes, the history of theory), to find (but read, fabricate) 
the origin of architecture – that one, single, dignified and pure origin that never 
existed. Even then the role of this “non-discipline” that is theory was indeed that of 
interrogation: asking questions of itself rather than formalizing appeasing solutions.  
 
Similarly, the recent post-theory2 movement in architecture, attempted again to fix-
frame architecture theory as a discipline, this time with a sentenced and staged death 
rather than with a search of origins. What it produced instead, rather than a forever 
after-theory, was indeed a restart moment of reenergizing, as it magnified questions of 
architecture at the beginning of the new millennium. The opposite of an after-theory 
has happened instead. Opening up the divergence between the critical and the 
projective, the debate has indeed set free and re-launched the thinking in architecture 
that is caught in between. And questions remain (some of which are addressed in this 
book). Dislodging architecture theory from an established and generational 
association with critical theory, with psychoanalysis, or with semiology or post-
structuralism, the after-theory moment in fact re-started conversations, not only with 
current developments in philosophy, but also with material sciences, politics and 
economy, and indeed with the convergence of them that we are now witnessing. Not 
only that: the bastardized origin-less material nature of architecture makes it the ideal 
ground to develop original thinking in making. 
 
 
In architecture 
 
Architecture theory needs to return to itself, that is to architecture, in order to find 
how it has changed, not why. Why it has changed is obvious and becomes a redundant 
statement if we imply architecture’s relationality as a sine qua non condition of its 
being.3 To look at “how” architecture theory is changing means to engage not only in 
exploring the relationship between architecture and theory, but also to redefine theory 
as a plurality of different and discordant contributions to how (the “how of hows”) 
theory is produced in architecture, which means: for architecture, about architecture 
and, more essentially, by architecture.  The idea of “in architecture” was introduced 
by Andrew Benjamin in his 2000 book Architectural Philosophy to think ‘the 
particularity of the architectural’ and ‘to engage with architecture understood as a site 
of repetition’, where ‘the critical is defined as a repetition that takes place again for 
the first time’.4 
 
That the thinking that defines architecture must happen (literally, take place) in 
architecture as a site of repetition has always been the case, whether this was being 
recognized at the time of its happening or not. This becomes apparent and almost 
inescapable with the demise of classical (and modernist) prescriptive theory, and with 
the emergence of an architectural history that is distinct from both art history and 
architectural practice, and triggers the formulation of questions in the specifics of 
architecture. From the mid-1960s the discipline of architectural theory started to be 
redefined and opened up to and by the non specifically architectural —borrowing 
from political ideologies, psychoanalysis, linguistics and semiology, literature 
criticism and cultural studies. As early as 1966 Aldo Rossi clearly articulated the 
intrinsically manifold nature of architecture, claiming for the “project” a unique and 
specific form of embedded criticality. In his text ‘Architettura per i musei’5 Rossi 
identifies the most important ‘moment’ of architecture theory in the ‘relationship 
between the theoretical view of architecture and the making of architecture’.6 It is in 
its making, through the combination of its multiform expressions – the text, the 
drawing, the building – that for Rossi architecture both produces and expresses its 
‘thinking’. Rossi sees the ‘thinking’ (pensare) in architecture as one with the ‘design’ 
(progettare) of architecture. Subjective, rational but also evocative, and far from the 
modernist prescriptive ‘method’, architecture theory for Rossi remains internal to the 
discipline of design. A stubborn obsession, architecture theory operates in architecture 
by choosing and selecting, focusing and persevering on the same problem, which is 
then repeatedly tackled by the different occasions of the “project”. Architecture 
produces an autonomous discourse that, while it is informed by external disciplines – 
in Rossi’s case, economy, sociology and linguistics –, is expressed by the specifics of 
the project, its representation and its construction. Reflective and iterative, critical and 
specific, architecture ‘presents itself as a meditation on things, on facts; its principles 
are few and immutable, but the concrete answers to changing topical problems that 
the architect and society can offer are manifold’.7 
 
 
Relation 
 
Architecture theory is not a discipline, and yet is it a practice, difficult to accept, to 
grasp even, because it is not regulated. It may be quiet, embedded in architecture’s 
buildings; it may subtle, silenced at times, but it is not going away, despite 
oppositions, dismissals and ridicule. Ridicule in fact it welcomes, as a sign that theory 
is very much alive, provoking and provocative of thinking, eliciting whatever 
reactions, making indifference impossible. The laughter that theory laughs is the 
Bataillean laughter that mirrors the being laughed at with laughing it back out, louder 
and sharper.8 It is the laughter of that least definable and frameable of theorists, 
through which the unfashionable shakes the established mainstream. Theory laughs, 
and it laughs back. 
 
Theory laughs also at itself. In prefacing the book series Frontiers of Theory,9 literary 
theorist and cultural critic Martin McQuillan writes that: ‘Since its inception Theory 
has been concerned with its own limits, end, and after-life.’ McQuillan observes that 
in its process of auto-critique Theory needs to ask:  
 
 […] what is the relation of Theory to philosophy and the other disciplines that 
inform it? What is the history of its construction and what processes of 
amnesia and the repression of difference have taken place to establish this 
thing called Theory? Is Theory still the site of a more-than-critical affirmation 
of a negotiation with thought, which thinks thought’s own limits?10 
 
And architecture theory? How does it construct itself? How does it reinvent itself and 
think its own limits (in the iterations of architecture’s project) while architecture 
continues to reinvent itself? 
 
As it reconsiders its status as a discipline in relation to digital technologies, material 
sciences, biology and environmental transformations, architecture continues to 
introject thoughts and practices developed ‘outside’ architecture. It is indeed its very 
openness and connectedness that offer a line of continuity in the ongoing process of 
self-definition and reinvention that has always characterized architecture as a practice 
of the multiple and of the critical, that, far from only making physical environments, 
continues to act in and through all its intersections with its “other” as a critical and 
cultural agent. Architecture has always borrowed narratives, tools, concepts and 
images from other disciplines, always defining itself in relation with an “other”. It is 
by definition relational: internally, in how it organizes itself through rules or 
paradigms of form and space making; externally, in how it relates to forms of 
inhabitation, use, and cultural and physical conditions.  
The relational nature of architecture is intrinsic to its making since the very 
beginnings – which are themselves multiple, uncertain, open and negotiated. 
Designed for human inhabitation and interaction, architecture needs to respond to 
requirements that are both practical and more extensively intangible: social, political, 
psychological, etc., depending on its spatial and temporal conditions of production.  
Architecture establishes, that is, a series of external relations, rules, narratives and 
situations.11 
 
Yet, in each instance of its repetition, in its every “act” – design, construction, 
practice, writing - architecture calls into question also its own languages, its materials, 
its history as a discipline, thus producing a self-redefinition at its every re-enactment.  
Is Architecture too, then, ‘A thought that thinks its own limits’? (to paraphrase 
McQuillan). Architecture changes itself in each of its “instalments”, in its repetitions; 
each time it is enmeshed in a web of relations, both external and internal, which affect 
it and which it produces. These relations occupy also a space that is only apparently 
void of architecture’s direct intervention. It is in these apparent voids that the 
relational nature of architecture emerges more forcefully, where possible alternative 
practices of architecture are exposed. It is in these “voids” that the discourse and the 
critical space of the words of architecture take place, as well as other alternative 
practices. It is in this space that the relational nature of architecture becomes more 
evident.12 
 
 
‘But that is not enough …’ 
 
Architecture theory is how architecture thinks itself and in itself, and therefore, 
ultimately, thinks what architecture is – not in the sense of grasping an impossible 
essence or fixed origin, but in order to confirm its multiple and changeable position in 
response to the basic issues of inhabitation and environment, and in relation to space 
and time. If there is an essence to what we do in architecture, and in thinking with it 
and writing in it, it is in this constant questioning. Because buildings can be 
architecture and architecture can be buildings, but the two do not necessarily coincide. 
It is the space of these differences and non-coincidences that architecture theory 
inhabits, explores and constantly redefines. 
 ‘But that is not enough’. Architecture theory is the ‘not enough’ of architecture, its 
‘not-enough-ing’, with the oppositional ‘but’ that accompanies it. ‘Aber das genügt 
nicht’, Walter Benjamin writes in a fragment of his First Sketches for the 
Passagenwerk (Arcades Project)13, one of the many in which he approaches the 
dialectical image as a constellation, a critical construct that itself escapes fixed 
definitions. 
 
It is said that the dialectical method consists in doing justice, at each moment, to 
the concrete historical situation of its object. But that is not enough. [Aber das 
genügt nicht.] For it is just as much a matter of doing justice to the concrete 
historical situation of the interest taken in the object. […] the object is felt to be 
concretized in this situation itself and upraised from its former being into the 
higher concretion of now-being [Jetzsein].’ 
 
For Walter Benjamin placing the historical object in its context is not enough; it is 
necessary to place it in relation with the current situation of the observation point. The 
historical object is always and again re-concretised in the present, and it is the 
dubitative “but” that triggers the performance of the “not-enough-ing”. In 
architecture, the now-being of the object is in the “not-enough-ing” that each time and 
again questions the stability and the finished-ness of the object. The architectural 
object therefore becomes a site of discourse. It is such kind of object that architecture 
needs to be: dialectical, tensioned, questioned and ultimately unstable. 
But that too is not enough. In his fragment Benjamin continues proposing the now-
being as a concretion that ‘has overcome the ideology of progress’, to pursue instead a 
philosophy of history that is ‘an increasing concentration (integration) of reality’.  
In architecture, this would mean to dismiss linear histories of pacifying progress, and 
seek an architecture that remains actively capable to engage both its past and present 
in a trans-historical, discipline-specific processes of self interrogation. For Benjamin 
the ‘dialectical penetration and actualization of former contexts puts the truth of all 
present action to the test.’ ‘But that is not enough’ then proposes a criticality that is 
intrinsic to the object under consideration, and that the object itself performs. The 
architectural object must perform, incessantly and relentlessly, a critique not only of 
its own time, but of the now-time of its activity. Architecture is such self-critical 
object, but within it it is the work of architecture theory that triggers its laughter. 
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Other Moods of Modernism,” in The New Architectural Pragmatism: A Harvard 
Design Magazine Reader, ed. William S. Saunders, Harvard Design Magazine 
Readers 5 (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2007), 22–33. See also: 
Michael Speaks, “Design Intelligence: Or Thinking After the End of Metaphysics,” 
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Violent Laughters,” in field:, vol. 6 no. 1. 2015, Urban Blind Spots (F. Kossak, T. 
Schneider, S. Walker, eds.), Sheffield:, The University of Sheffield, 97-111. 
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4 Andrew Benjamin, Architectural Philosophy, (London and New Brunswick NJ: The 
Athlone Press, 2000), 3. 
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sull’architettura e la città, 1956-1972 (Milan: CittàStudi, 1975), 323-339. 
6 Rossi, Scritti scelti, 323. My translation. 
7 Rossi, Scritti scelti, 328. My translation. 
8 See: Georges Bataille, “The Labyrinth” (1935-6) now in Georges Bataille, Visions of 
Excess. Selected Writings, 1927-39 (trans. A. Stoekl) (Minneapolis: University of 
Minnesota Press, 1985). Writer, critic, philosopher, independent intellectual who 
operated outside academia and across disciplines, Georges Bataille (1897-1962) 
																																																																																																																																																														
performs in his work a counter-reading of reality. The subversive character of his 
texts does not consist in a demolition from the outside of established sets of values, 
but in a systematic and pungent exposé of their contradictions and intrinsic 
ambiguities. The laughter that he discusses in “The Labyrinth” is a key instrument in 
Bataille’s critique of society. 9	Martin McQuillan, “Series Editor’s Preface,” in Andrew Benjamin, Of Jews and 
Animals, [Frontiers of Theory], (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2010), xi-
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Cities of Artificial Excavation: the work of Peter Eisenman, 1978-1988 (New York 
and Montreal: Rizzoli and CCA, 1994), and Peter Eisenman, “Diagram: An Original 
Scene of Writing,” in Peter Eisenman, Written into the Void: Selected writings, 1990-
2004 (New Haven CT: Yale University Press, 2007), 87-94. 
12 See: Stoppani, “Relational Architecture: Dense Voids and Violent Laughters.” 
13 Walter Benjamin, Passagenwerk [O°, 5]. In Walter Benjamin, “First Sketches,”, in 
The Arcades Project, translated by Howard Eiland and Kevin McLaughlin 
(Cambridge MA and London: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1999), 
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